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Abstract: The effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have drawn attention to the 
psychological consequences of national incidents. Psychological consequences are instantiated 
by changes in behavior. Changes in behavior can be significant, substantial, and can span a 
duration that would impact the economy, human safety, and/or infrastructure sectors. This paper 
describes likely drivers of what is termed “fear-induced avoidance behavior.” Fear-induced 
avoidance behavior is behavior caused by fear or anxiety of an activity, which then causes 
avoidance of said activity—a prominent example being many people’s fear-induced avoidance of 
flying after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. This paper presents a system dynamics 
model of the driving forces that induce fear avoidance and the forces that assist in system 
recovery. This model was not based on any specific historical incident to allow for application of 
the model to multiple types of incidents. Major components of this model include: Consumer 
needs; Risk perception; and Consumers’ ability to substitute one activity for another (e.g., 
driving instead of flying). Through the use of the system dynamics framework the authors are 
able to provide potential non-intuitive policies that could assist in minimizing psychological 
consequences stemming from national incidents. 
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1.  Introduction 
The effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have drawn attention to the 
psychological consequences of national incidents. Psychological consequences are instantiated 
by changes in behavior. Changes in behavior can be significant, substantial, and can span a 
duration that would impact the economy, human safety, and/or infrastructure sectors. 0 
A major challenge in using the term psychological consequence is that it is broad. The 2010 
DHS Risk Lexicon defines psychological consequence as an “effect of an incident, event, or 
occurrence on the mental or emotional state of individuals or groups resulting in a change in 
perception and/or behavior.” [9]  This definition includes aspects of psychology that are not 
practical to measure on a societal scale. These include “mental and emotional state” and 
“change[s] in perception.” Therefore this paper’s focus is on observable and significant changes 
in behavior. Furthermore, these observable changes in behavior must be significant, substantial, 
and span a duration that would impact the economy, human safety, and/or infrastructure 
operation. 
This paper focuses on better understanding of what is termed “fear-induced avoidance behavior.” 
Simply put fear-induced avoidance behavior is behavior caused by fear or anxiety of an activity 
causing avoidance of said activity. The avoidance of certain activities have economic 
consequences. 
 
Fear-induced avoidance behavior differs from the psychological definition of avoidance behavior 
that is associated with avoidance of social situations due to a psychological disorder. Fear-
induced avoidance behavior captures a natural protective response to a perceived risk post-
incident. Particular emphasis to fear-induced avoidance is due to a body of literature that has 
shown that fear-induced avoidance behavior resulting from an incident can have significant 
consequences in terms of economics, sentiment, and safety.[1] In addition, changes in behavior 
can have great and unexpected impacts on the functionality of infrastructure and the evolution of 
infrastructure. 
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2.  Literature Review of Economic Impacts of Consumer Fear-
Induced Avoidance 
Economic consequences of national incidents arise and propagate by various means, depending 
on the nature of the disaster and the way it unfolds. In general, the level of economic output can 
be represented as a function of available capital and labor, and the effects of disruptions can be 
represented as reductions in the available labor or capital, if there are no significant changes in 
the population behaviors or the structure of the underlying economy. 
Many incidents such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, destroy parts of available capital or 
the underlying infrastructure and as a result affect the labor availability, thus generating direct 
and indirect economic losses. It is normally assumed that the population behaviors, aside from 
immediate response to disruption or the restoration efforts, do not change in a systemic fashion. 
This literature review describes evidence that is contradictory to the often-stated economic 
assumptions that consumer behavior does not change post-incident. Given that a significant 
fraction of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) depends on consumer purchasing behaviors, 
persistent changes said behaviors have a significant potential to impact GDP. 
 
2.1.  Consumer Fear-Induced Avoidance from Pandemics 
Outbreaks of infectious diseases are one example where changes in the population behaviors 
may have significant economic impacts. Dauelsberg and Outkin (2005) demonstrate the effects 
with a simulation study of a representative city of five million people in the event of a pandemic 
disease. [7]   
They explicitly model the population’s response to events, including self-quarantine-related 
behaviors, as well as hording and latent demand. GDP produced in a particular area was 
represented with the Cobb-Douglas production functions, where capital and labor are the main 
determinants of production. The general form for the Cobb-Douglas production function is as 
follows:  
         	
where:	
K	is	capital;		
L	is	labor;	and	
a,	 	and	 	are	positive,	appropriately	calibrated	coefficients.	
 
Dauelsberg and Outkin (2005) used a system dynamics model that explicitly represents the labor 
and the fraction of capital available and calculates the economic impacts as a function of those 
parameters and the state of supporting infrastructures. They also showed that the population 
exhibits behaviors during pandemic situations such as compliance with quarantine measures or 
self-imposed quarantine. While these measures significantly reduce mortality, they increase the 
total GDP losses from approximately $17 billion in the stated scenario where no mandatory or 
self-imposed quarantine occurs to $55 billion, where most of the population imposes a self-	 4
quarantine for a significant period of time. This illustrates the fact that population response is one 
of the most significant factors affecting the severity of GDP disruption effects. 
Many studies estimating economic impacts from an avian influenza discuss the possibility of 
shifts in consumer spending. In a presentation given at the Brookings Institution in October of 
2006, Warwick McKibbin explains that for his results “in the minor scenarios, it is actually the 
human response rather than the labor changes that drive the economic changes.”[15]  Table 1 
summarizes the reductions in GDP caused by consumer spending reductions for various 
pandemic studies.
3 In most of these studies researchers assumed a consumer spending reduction 
or reallocation, which leads to a reduction in GDP. 
Table 1. GDP losses attributable to consumer spending reductions 
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Pandemic Influenza Economic 
Studies 
 
Scope 
Annualized 
reduction of 
GDP 
Low High 
Asian Development Bank  Asia (excl. Japan)  1.15%  6.50% 
Lowy/Brookings Institution
1 U.S.  0.01%  0.80% 
BMO-Nesbitt Burns  Global  0.7%  2.3% 
Congressional Budget
2 U.S.  0.5%  2.0% 
Douglas, Szeto and Buckle
3 New  Zealand  3.6%  4.5% 
James & Sargent  Canada  0%
4 0.4% 
Jonung & Röeger  Europe  0.5% 
Kennedy, Thompson, & Vujanovic  Australia  1.6% 
National Infrastructure Simulation and 
Analysis Center (Baseline)  U.S. 0.2%  2.2% 
Notes	for	Table:	(1)	Confined	to	Agriculture,	manufacturing,	and	services.	(2)	Actual	amount	varies	by	industry	
(3)	One	scenario	was	conducted;	the	range	represents	the	industry	range.	(4)	Assuming	Full	Demand	Reallocation	
	
The literature justifies an expected consumer response similar to the World Bank by explaining 
that individuals would “avoid infection by minimizing face-to-face interactions, resulting in 
temporary reductions in consumer expenditures for services such as tourism, mass transportation, 
retail sales, hotels and restaurants.”[2] This is consistent with the definition of fear-induced 
avoidance behavior. 
Many of these studies rely in part on evidence from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
when determining the magnitude of behavioral changes. In the Forster and Tang analysis of 
SARS, they describe the outbreak as a ‘crisis of fear’ wherein “the infrastructure of Hong Kong 
was fully functional but the normal activities of citizens were severely curtailed by fear of 
infection”. [11]  
																																																								
3 The authors made a sincere effort to present this data consistently; however, some discrepancies likely remain as 
studies have used different approaches, models, and assumptions. 
4 Table References: [2] [15] [6] [5] [10] [18] [13] [14]   	 5
But other incidents, including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), or Mad Cow Disease, 
hurricanes, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States also provide 
evidence of a quantifiable change in consumer behavior. 
 
2.2.  Consumer Fear-Induced Avoidance from Food and Agriculture Sector 
Incidents 
In a study on consumer reactions to Mad Cow Disease, the Pennings et al. noted, “behavior of 
consumers in a crisis situation is not always consistent with the true level of risk they face.” [17]  
The authors collected survey data from shoppers in the United States, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. They were focused on why consumers change their behavior and whether marketers 
or policymakers would have any influence to contain the reaction. They decoupled consumers’ 
choices on beef consumption into differences among risk perceptions and risk attitudes. If the 
probability of an incident is accurately known, then risk perception is likely to have a greater 
influence on consumer behavior. In this case, public policy and marketers have the opportunity 
to influence decisions through providing clear information regarding the risks. However, if risk 
attitudes dominate decisions, there is little that can be done to change consumer behavior, other 
than eliminate the risk. Another study on Mad Cow Disease found evidence that scientists had a 
greater avoidance of beef products following the BSE outbreak than the public at large, 
suggesting that more informed consumers would be more risk adverse. [12]  
A study by the Food Policy Institute in 2003 analyzed economic factors involved with agro-
terrorism. [19]  This study showed that eliminating all sources of uncertainty is not sufficient to 
regain consumer confidence and return demand to initial levels. The authors commented on the 
potential limited ability to generalize this statement to non-food products due to the strong link 
that is often made between eating a food product and becoming sick. [19]  
L. Calvin, et al., studied a case of decline in demand for raspberries after a Cyclosporiasis 
outbreak was discovered in Guatemala. Despite many controls placed by Guatemala and the 
United States, the perceived risk outstripped the benefit even when raspberry prices were heavily 
discounted. By the year 2000 only 77 out of 369 Guatemalan raspberry farms remained. [3]  
This evidence suggests that consumers do change their behavior in response to changes in their 
perceived risks; however, the underlying assumptions concerning the magnitude and extent of 
behavioral changes are by no means certain, especially when trying to tie the fear that people 
will have during a pandemic to hypothetical changes that people make in actual purchases and 
work habits. Few studies have attempted to quantify the assumptions of consumer behavior with 
non-survey data.  
One exception is the study by Sargent and James who looked at the available data from SARS, 
the 1918 pandemic, and other less severe pandemics. While the authors acknowledge people 
must have been scared during these outbreaks, they found little evidence to suggest consumers 
dramatically changed their spending habits. They found for the 1918 pandemic there was little 
effect on retail sales, external trade, financial markets, or bankruptcies. Other researchers support 
the Sargent and James findings that humans are exceptional at adapting to extreme 
circumstances. The positive responses that occur after the negative effect are likely to outweigh 
the initial shock. They criticize research that predicts large negative impacts because the analysis 
“. . . rarely considers the response to disaster impacts as part of the same event.” [18]  	 6
 
2.3.  Consumer Fear-Induced Avoidance from Terrorism Incidents 
Terrorist attacks represent major shocks for a country’s economy and are beyond the control of 
consumers and firms. Terrorist attacks can have severe consequences, both at the macro and the 
micro level. Macroeconomic analysis is useful in understanding the economic implications of 
terrorism at a national level, but it cannot shed light on the effect of the fear of terrorism on 
consumer spending at the individual and household level. However, consumer’s economic 
decisions in response to natural and manmade events that cause fear and adversity can have 
important implications for aggregate consumption.  
Degeneffe et al. (2006) sought to understand the reactions of U.S. consumers in the event of 
disasters or terrorist events. They surveyed consumers, men and women ranging in age from 24-
65 from Chicago, IL and Maplewood, MN to gauge attitudes across the U.S. [8] 
Survey respondents were asked to indicate how concerned they are about six specific terrorist 
incidents including:  
  Attack on public transportation; 
  Biological or chemical agent in a crowded area;  
  Contamination of a common food product; 
  Attack using passenger aircraft; 
  Disruption of electric power grid; and 
  Destruction of national monuments. 
Across all modes of attack the greatest level of concern was for attack on public transportation. 
All respondents expect another attack similar to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to 
occur during their lifetimes; however, there was no indication of consumers changing their daily 
behaviors because of the possibility of terrorist events. [8]  
Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) investigated the effects of terrorist events on household 
spending and consumption switching. The authors relied on data from the 2002 U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study to locate factors that influence consumer insecurity, expectations about 
terrorism, and spending patterns. Respondents to this survey are U.S. residents who were age 50 
and older between April 2002 and January 2003. The respondents were asked the following three 
questions: 
  How much -if any- have the events of September 11 shaken your own personal sense of 
safety and security: have they shaken it a great deal, a good amount, not too much, or not 
at all? 
  What do you think is the percent chance that there will be a major incident of bio-
terrorism in the United States in the next five years, directly affecting 100 people or 
more? 
  What do you think is the percent chance that you, yourself, will be a victim of bio-
terrorism in the next five years? 	 7
The researchers found that gender influenced fears related to physical threats; women were more 
concerned about physical safety than men. The distribution of the answers to the three terrorism-
related questions varied across the different socio-economic variables. [4]  
Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) also found that anxiety due to terrorism and the expectation of 
being a victim are greater for those with the following characteristics: 
  Less than 65 years old;  
  Female;  
  Depressed;  
  Non-white; 
  Low educational achievement; 
  Low income; 
  No military service; 
  Religious; and 
  Live in New England, Mid-Atlantic, or the Southeast. [4]  
The expectation of a bioterrorist attack in the United States was positively correlated with higher 
education, depression, regular use of the Internet, and larger economic resources. [4]  The 
authors found that the overall effect of terrorism on household spending is ambiguous and 
suggest examining consumption switching among goods since terrorism may influence 
individuals to spend differently among consumer goods. Among all expenditures 
5 the 
researchers found that consumers tended to spend more on vehicles costs and less on recreation 
and public transportation when expecting terrorism or bio-terrorism events. [4]  
	  
																																																								
5 “expenditures” refers to food at home, alcohol, food outside home, medical expenses, clothing, vehicles costs, 
gasoline, public transportation, and recreation. 	 8
3.  Model of Fear-Induced Avoidance 
An abstracted system dynamics model of the underlying factors that cause fear-induced 
avoidance behaviors was developed. This model serves as a prototype that combines several 
salient aspects of fear-induced avoidance behaviors. The most relevant system structures 
characterized include the driving forces that induce avoidance as well as the forces that assist in 
system recovery. This model was not based on any specific historical incident to allow for 
application of the model to multiple types of incidents.  
The underlying reference mode that the authors targeted is a sudden drop in the performance of a 
specific activity and eventual recovery of the performance of said activity. The term “activity” is 
used as a generalized term for activities that people might avoid due to an incident. These 
activities could include things such as airline travel, the use of public transit, or tourism to a 
certain location. An example of the target model behavior is the de-seasonalized time series 
graph of airline travel pre- and post the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 shown in Figure 1. 
	
	
Figure 1. U.S. Airline Passengers January 1999 to January 2005 
6 
The authors designed the model to explain the underlying causes of fear-induced avoidance 
behavior. They developed the Fear-Induced Avoidance Model to provide decision support on 
ways to reduce fear-induced avoidance behaviors and to improve the recovery from fear-induced 
avoidance behaviors. The model is for use on a case-by-case basis to explain the potential for 
fear-induced avoidance behaviors and it can be parameterized for specific incidents. 
3.1.  Causal Loop Diagram 
The basic overview of the model structure is captured in the causal loop diagram (CLD) within 
Figure 2. The model itself contains many more variables and parameters that codify the model 
logic, ensure unit consistency, and allow for model testing not shown in the figure. Relationships 
between variables use the “S” (same direction) and “O” (opposite direction) conventions as 
opposed to “+” or “-”. Figure 2 is referenced and explained in greater detail in sections 3.1.1 – 
3.1.4.  
																																																								
6		Figure	source:	[16]			 9
 
	
	
Figure 2. Causal loop diagram of Fear-Induced Avoidance Model 
3.1.1  B1: Original Activity Meeting Desires Loop 
The first major loop within the model is balancing loop B1. This loop describes the needs and 
desires of consumers or individuals and the means by which the original activity meets those 
desires for said individuals. In the model the authors defines the “original activity” as the activity 
that is carried out prior to the incident and that could be impacted by the incident. 
In this model needs and desires are generically defined. In reality the variety of needs and desires 
can be large and can span fundamental needs of food and water, which have a measurable 
quantity, to something that is soft and difficult to measure such as need for social interaction. In 
the model, needs and desires (variable “Unfulfilled Desire/Need”) create consumer demand for 
an activity that fulfills those needs and desires (variable “Desire for Activities that Fulfill 
Desire/Need”). This increases a consumer’s propensity for performing an activity that fulfills 
those desires (variable “Propensity Towards Original Activity”). Finally, the actual performance 
of the original activity (variable “Performance of Original Activity”) fulfills the consumer’s 
backlog of needs and desires (variable “Unfulfilled Desire/Need”).  
3.1.2  R1: Incident Causes Increased Perception of Risks Decreasing Performance of 
Original Activity 
The second major loop within the model is self-reinforcing loop R1. This loop describes the 
impact of an incident on the performance of the original activity. An incident occurs (variable 
“Incident”). The media broadcasts this incident and the prevalence of the incident in the media 
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(variable “Prevalence in the Media”) drives the overall perception of risk when performing the 
original activity (variable “Perceived Risk of Original Activity”). Due to the increase in 
perceived risk the propensity for performing the original activity (variable “Propensity Towards 
Original Activity”) is lowered.  
If it were the case that there were no other means for meeting a person’s needs and desires, then 
eventually the backlog of an individual’s or consumer’s needs and desires would force them to 
perform the original activity. If this were the case, every time an individual or group of 
individuals performed the original activity, they would increase their experience with the original 
activity post-incident (variable “Experience with Activity Post Incident”). As the number of 
times the original activity is performed post-incident increases, an individual’s experience with 
performing the activity reduces their perceived risk of performing that activity. In addition, 
individuals in the system can choose to share their positive experience with others causing the 
performance of the original activity to recover more rapidly in general. 
It is important to note that in the model, the perception of risk of the original activity decreases 
over time due to lowered prevalence of the incident in an individual’s memory as time passes 
(via variable “Persistence of Perceived Risk of Original Activity”). However, the lowering in the 
perception of risk does not necessarily mean the return of consumers to the original activity. This 
is consistent with Turvey et al. who showed that eliminating all sources of uncertainty is not 
sufficient to regain consumer confidence and return demand to initial levels.[19] The authors 
posit that the return to the original activity is, therefore, driven by individuals’ needs and desires. 
This will be further explained in the following sections. 
3.1.3  R2: A Substitute Activity 
Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) suggest that terrorism may influence individuals to spend 
differently among consumer goods. [4]  Loop R2 considers this possibility. This loop provides 
the feedback structure to enable individuals to choose between the original activity and an 
alternate activity (variable “Propensity Towards Original Activity” vs. variable “Propensity 
Towards Alternative Activities”). The model makes some simplifying assumptions in terms of 
the ability to adopt an alternate activity: 
  There exists an alternate activity that can meet all or some of the needs and desires that 
the original activity met; 
  The alternate activity has the capacity to handle all or most of the original activity’s 
demand; and 
  Individuals choose between one activity or another. 
The second assumption is particularly important, since it might not be possible for the alternative 
activity to meet the overall demand the original activity met. If this were the case, additional 
model structure would need to be added to account for system capacity and reduction of quality 
as congestion in the system increases. 
3.1.4  B2: Substitute Activity Adopted 
Given an incident, the propensity to perform the original activity is decreased. As this occurs, 
people begin to perform alternative activities to meet their needs and desires. A common 	 11
example is following the attacks of 11 September 2001 people chose to drive instead of flying. 
The performance of the substitute then meets the needs and desires of individuals (to a degree). 
Despite the fact there are alternative means for accomplishing a goal, alternative activities are 
rarely perfect substitutes. That is, the performance of the alternative activity rarely offers all of 
the benefits of the original activity. For example, teleconferencing into a meeting offers some of 
the benefits of attending, until lunch occurs and people have individual conversations. 
Teleconferences are a great money and time saving device for attending a presentation, but tend 
to be terrible devices for networking during breaks. However, it is possible an alternative activity 
may offer some additional benefits. For example shopping online is more convenient than 
shopping in a physical store or mall.  
When an incident occurs it is important to understand the effectiveness of the activity to meet 
individuals’ needs. Given an incident, there are two possibilities in the model: 
  The alternative activity does not fully meet the significant set of needs and desires of an 
individual and, therefore, individuals will migrate back to the original activity, given a 
certain backlog of needs, desire, or reduction in the perception of risk with the original 
activity; or 
  The alternative activity does meet or is an improvement on the original activity and, 
therefore, individuals do not migrate back to the original activity due to the perceived 
risk, as well as the fact that the activity might be an improvement over the original. 
Parameters (variables “Ability for Original Activity to Fulfill Desires/Needs” and “Ability for 
Alternative Activity to fulfill Desires/Needs”) drive the effectiveness of the alternate activity on 
meeting desires. These parameters are tested in the model demonstration section. 
 
3.2.  Model Structure 
The	following	section	includes	some	of	the	key	equations	included	within	the	model	as	well	
as	some	sample	model	runs	and	the	implications	of	parameter	changes.	To	see	an	overview	
of	the	Vensim	model	diagram	please	see	Appendix	A.	
	
3.2.1  Key Equations and Graphical Functions 
Most of the model structure is quite simple. The most important equation in the model is perhaps 
the flow that controls the movement of population performing “Activity A” the original activity 
and “Activity B” the alternative activity.  The equation for this variable is as follows: 
 
        	       	 	   	 		  	
           ∗                0,          ∗       	 
    	            	 	  	 
 
 
Where: 
A is the current population in Stock A that performs Activity A 
B is the current population in Stock B that performs Activity B 
Amin and Bmin are exogenous minima placed on Stock A and B 
DUnmet is the effect of unmet demand that allows for people to adopt Activity B 	 12
 
Admittedly this formulation is perhaps too simple for a situation with more than one alternative. 
Additionally, this formulation places minima for populations in activity A and B. This could be 
improved by creating a structure that endogenously induces minima, however, this may require 
further characterization of the need and desires structure within the model. 
 
An additional and important note about the formation is that the risk perception of Activity A 
(once an incident occurs) lingers in the model and can either be reduced exogenously through a 
time constant or endogenously through the performance of Activity A post-incident. State 
variables are present to represent both the prevalent perception of risk as well as the performance 
of Activity A post-incident. 
 
Several variables are instantiated as graphical functions. These include the following variables: 
  Effect of Unmet Demand by A on Adopting B 
  Graphical Function for Propensity to Perform Activity 
  Graphical Function on Effect of Perceived Risk on Propensity for Activity 
These	graphical	functions	are	used	to	represent	key	effects	from	one	variable	to	another.	
“Effect	of	Unmet	Demand	by	A	on	Adopting	B”	is	used	to	capture	the	effect	on	relevant	
populations	to	adopt	B	vs.	staying	with	A.	This	variable	allows	for	a	new	steady	state	where	
people	permanently	adopt	B.		
	
The	“Graphical	Function	for	the	Propensity	to	Perform	Activity”	serves	as	means	to	delay	
the	desire	for	wanting	to	purchase	goods	immediately	when	a	desire	is	instantiated.	It	
defines	a	threshold	limit	for	when	a	backlog	is	not	tolerable	for	acquiring	a	desired	good	or	
service.	This	is	to	say	when	a	person	desires	something;	immediate	satisfaction	for	that	
desire	is	not	necessarily	required.	People	are	willing	to	batch	needs	and	desires	and	then	
perform	an	activity	to	simultaneously	(and	more	efficiently)	fulfill	those	desires	(e.g.	if	you	
run	out	of	jam	you	may	not	immediately	head	out	to	the	store	until	you	need	more	
important	goods	like	butter	and	bread).	
	
The	last	graphical	function	is	perhaps	the	most	important	“Graphical	Function	on	the	Effect	
of	Perceived	Risk	on	the	Propensity	for	Activity	A.”	This	variable	serves	as	a	major	
component	to	control	the	movement	of	a	population	towards	the	(temporary)	adoption	of	
activity	A.	Depending	on	the	size	of	an	incident,	the	perception	of	risk	towards	performing	
activity	A	may	be	negligible	or	large.	With	the	graphical	function	presented,	smaller	
incidents	have	hardly	no	impact	on	the	performance	of	activity	A	and	much	larger	incidents	
might	have	a	large	and	potentially	proportional	effect	on	the	performance	of	Activity	A.	
This	formulation	may	not	be	correct,	and	in	future	efforts	to	develop	this	model,	it	might	be	
worth	studying	how	alternative	graphical	functions	may	impact	the	dynamics	of	the	model.	
	
Screenshots	of	graphical	functions	are	included	in	Appendix	B.	
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3.2.2  Model Demonstration 
The significance of model output is currently viewed in terms of the percentage of people who 
are performing the original activity versus an alternate activity. Figure 3. shows the switch from 
activity A to activity B during the incident (at day 10) and the eventual recovery. The time scale 
is notional. In this simple model the population shift is immediate, whereas in reality it might 
take time for individuals to find alternative activities. This is a simplifying assumption, although 
delays can be added in future developments of this model. 
	
	
Figure 3. Percent of population performing activity A 
and activity B.  
As a test, analysts varied the size of the incident in the model. The incident size is a parameter in 
the model that is supposed to represent the extent and the overall scope of the incident in a single 
number. The baseline is represented by an incident of size 20. In Figure 4 the authors varied 
incident size value (10, 40, 100 respectively). The size value changed the depth and scope of 
avoidance of activity A. This is expected, as a larger incident would logically result in more 
avoidance than a smaller one. The overall shape of the avoidance and recovery curve changes 
with risk perception. Risk perception is more easily overcome for a smaller incident than a larger 
incident.  
Larger incidents have an initial deeper dip and then recover slightly and stagnate at a lower level. 
This particular shape is due to an initial shock that causes more individuals to halt their 
performance of activity A. However, because activity B is not a perfect substitute to activity A 
(see Section 3.2.2.1 for more information), individuals return to activity A to meet some of their 
needs and desires, causing a mild recovery in performance until risk perception of activity A is 
reduced. 
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Figure 4. Impact of varying incident size 
3.2.2.1  Impact of the Effectiveness for Alternative Activity to Meet Needs and Desire 
The effectiveness of activity B to meet needs and desires greatly impacts the recovery of activity 
A. In Figure 5 the authors varied the effectiveness of activity B to meet the needs and desires of 
individuals. Baseline is set at 0.01. As the effectiveness for activity B to meet the needs and 
desires increases, activity A recovers less. 
As stated in previous sections, there is no structure in the model that accounts for the ability for 
activity B to handle the demands of activity A (which would also be a factor); however, Figure 5 
is instructive as to the driving forces for the recovery of an activity post-incident. While 
perception of risk is an important variable that can control whether performance of activity A 
occurs or does not, the backlog of needs and desires is what drives consumers and individuals to 
perform an alternate activity. 
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Figure 5. Impact of varying the effectiveness of Activity B to meet needs 
3.2.3  Future Development  
Currently the model has few data requirements; however, further testing and validation of the 
model does require data. Data needed to further model testing and validation include: 
  Data on the reduction of performance of an activity after an incident (e.g., the post-9/11 
flight data set), 
  Data of alternate activities rising after an incident (e.g., increase in driving), 
  Data on the perceived risks of performing the original activity (e.g., survey data on fear 
and perceived risks of flight), and 
  Data on needs and desires (e.g., Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] data on travel 
expenditures). 
Additionally, further improvements to the model structure and further review of the relevant 
literature (including psychology and marketing) may allow for improvement of model structure. 
Once structural improvements are complete, future development of this model could include an 
implementation in agent-based frameworks to provide further insight into how the interaction of 
various individuals following the logic outlined in this model would impact the emergent 
behavior. 
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4.  Conclusions 
In this paper the authors performed a literature review, developed salient causal links between 
relevant variables, and developed a model that explains the major facets and causes of fear-
induced avoidance behaviors. This kind of behavior has been documented to cause significant 
impacts after a national incident occurs. Key examples of fear-induced avoidance behavior 
include the post the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 airline travel avoidance as well as 
other prominent national and international incidents. While this model is still in its initial 
development stages, the authors believe that the following dynamics play a key role in causing 
fear-induced behaviors: 
  Risk perception is a major driver of fear-induced avoidance, however, simply reducing 
the perception of risk will not mean a return to the previous levels of activity. Simply 
providing individuals and consumers a reminder that the activity they are avoiding is safe 
may not be sufficient to have them return to pervious levels of activity. 
  People perform certain activities because it meets a desire or need. Given sufficient 
knowledge of, access to, and capacity of an activity people will nominally flock to the 
most “efficient” means to meet their needs and desires. The notion of efficiency here is 
not only bounded but differs from person-to-person. As the reader might have their own 
likes and needs for certain goods and services the authors might have different ones. 
These needs an desires can be as tangible as a car to the need for social interaction. The 
underlying needs drive the purpose of why people will perform certain activities.  
  The authors posit that the driver for consumers returning to previous levels of activity is 
dependent on their continued demand for goods or services that the activity the 
consumers are avoiding met. 
  If there exists an alternate means of performing activities that consumers avoid post-
incident, and these alternate means are near perfect substitutes, then the incident may 
catalyze a permanent transition to the less risky or more effective of the two activities. 
This might have some important policy implications. 
  Ultimately, most activities are not perfect substitutes (i.e., driving is not a perfect 
substitute to flying, online shopping is not a perfect substitute to shopping at the mall), 
therefore most consumers will return to their previous activity, given the same needs, 
desires, and sufficient elapsed time. However, an important factor not included in the 
model is the fact that incidents can induce changes in consumer spending as there may be 
less overall economic activity as a result of an incident. This is an important dynamic that 
needs further investigation. 
These dynamics give insight into potential policies that could be pursued to mitigate the 
psychological consequences of an incident. Given the fact that incidents may influence 
individuals to spend differently among consumer goods [4] there are some effective policies to 
counter act psychological consequences post-incident. 
Currently governments pursue a risk reduction regime to reduce the perception of risk. It has 
been documented that simply reducing risk does not reduce the perception of risk [17] 
Additionally, it has been shown that eliminating all sources of uncertainty is not sufficient to 
regain consumer confidence and return demand to initial levels.[19] While reducing actual risk 	 17
and informing the public that the risk has been reduced are important aspects of post-incident 
response, equally important (and perhaps more effective) is to remind individuals why the 
activity that they are avoiding provides them a real and perceivable benefit to any adopted 
alternatives. Additionally, logical arguments regarding risk are useful, strategies targeting affect 
are as important as reducing risk. 
It is also possible that if no policy is enacted to respond to an incident, in the long-term the 
consumers will return to the original activity. This would be true given no viable alternatives are 
available, needs have not changed, or the activity is still available to be performed. 
Further development and testing of this model is required to verify the accuracy of these claims. 
Additional information regarding pre-incident priming would be useful as it may lead individuals 
to be more psychologically resilient to incidents – preempting psychological consequence. 
Formulating a model that would adequately represent the avoidance of a certain historical 
incident (such as 9-11 or food contamination issues) may also provide more insights within those 
areas of study. 
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Appendix A: Diagram of Model Structure 
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Appendix B: Screenshots of Graphical Functions 
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